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ALLIES BACK RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE WITH FINLAND

WHILE the Finnish government postpones acceptance of the Russian armistice terms as announced by the Moscow radio on February 29, Finland's hope that it will be able to bargain for a better offer is becoming more and more illusory. Russian planes have attacked Finnish cities and ports and the Red Army is now within 100 miles of Tallinn, an Estonian naval base from which the Russians might be able to control the Gulf of Finland. Moreover, both Britain and the United States, to whom the Finns have long looked for intervention, are presenting a united front with the U.S.S.R. In his latest speech Prime Minister Churchill endorsed Russia's view that it has the "right to reassurance against further attacks from the West," and early in February Secretary of State Hull reiterated his advice to the Finns to get out of the war at once.

RUSSIA'S TERMS. Judged by the fact that the Finns participated in the siege of Leningrad and allowed the Germans to use their northern port of Petsamo in preying on Anglo-American supply routes to Murmansk, the proposed Russian armistice terms seem moderate indeed. No call for "unconditional surrender" is made and no request for changes in the present Finnish government is included, although the Russians indicate they would welcome a more friendly cabinet in Helsinki. The proposals provide, first, that the Russo-Finnish border be left as established in 1940, following the "winter war." This means that the whole of the Karelian Isthmus—including Finland's second largest city, Viborg, and its famous Mannerheim Line fortifications—as well as the Finnish coast of Lake Ladoga would become part of the U.S.S.R. The Russians also demand that Finland break off relations with Germany and intern Nazi forces, estimated at seven divisions, in northern Finland. If, however, the Finns need help in disposing of the Germans, they can call on the Red Army, on the explicit understanding that the Russians will

withdraw immediately after accomplishing this task. In conclusion, Moscow reserves for later discussion the question of reparations, demobilization of the Finnish army, and disposal of the Petsamo region.

The Russian terms appear reasonable not only when considered in the context of Finland's participation in the war against the U.S.S.R., but alongside the demands Moscow has made on the Polish government-in-exile. This relative leniency may spring in part from the fact that a lesser degree of animosity has historically characterized Russo-Finnish relations than has been true of the Russians and Poles. But the chief reason must be sought in the Red Army's view of military strategy. Its experience in this war has indicated that Poland is the natural battleground for a grand assault on the Soviet Union, while Finland is valuable to an enemy only in blocking Russian supply lines and launching localized attacks. The strategic interpretation of the Moscow terms is borne out by the fact that in 1940 the Russians handed back Petsamo to the Finns while now, after the port has figured prominently in blocking the routes of Allied supplies to Murmansk, Moscow reserves it as a subject of later negotiations.

THE FINNS' OBJECTIONS. Despite the moderate character of the Russian demands and the enormous military pressure being brought to bear on the Finns, the government in Helsinki continues to raise numerous objections to Moscow's stipulations. For one thing, the Finns dread being cut off from German supplies of food and fuel, and fear that their country will become a battleground for the German and Russian armies, as the Nazis may fight to defend their access to vital Finnish supplies. Probably the most important reason for the Finnish government's hesitation is its fear that once the Russians have occupied Finland they will remain permanently. This distrust of the Soviet Union dates from the period when the Finns were included in the Tsarist Empire,

and has been the keystone of Finland's foreign policy since the republic was established in 1917. In their struggle against both Russian domination and the influence of the Bolsheviks, Finnish Nationalists—consisting for the most part of the nobility and merchants—obtained German aid. During the succeeding years, Finland looked at various times to the Scandinavian and Western nations or to Germany for support against the U.S.S.R. Now that the Soviet Union has emerged as the strongest military and political power in this area, Finnish foreign policy can no longer rest on its traditional basis but must seek a new orientation. Such a modification in policy might, perhaps, be made along the lines followed by President Benes of Czechoslovakia, who believes that the best interests of his country can be preserved only by close friendship with both the Soviet Union and the Western powers instead of by playing the latter against the U.S.S.R.

STAKE OF ALL UNITED NATIONS. Although getting Finland out of the war is of primary concern to the Russians and Finns, this event would have significance for the other United Nations as well. Militarily, removal of the German troops from Finland and a shortening of the eastern front would release Red Army units for service elsewhere—perhaps for a thrust against the Baltic states in a move that might serve as a corollary to Anglo-American attacks in Western Europe this spring. Politically, the results for the United Nations as a whole would also be far-reaching, since Finland's conclusion of peace

might be expected to have repercussions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, where losses on the eastern front and from Anglo-American air attacks are increasing dissatisfaction with Axis domination. Moreover, Britain and the United States might expect to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. in applying armistice terms to Finland on the basis of the precedent for joint action established by the Mediterranean Commission and emphasized by President Roosevelt's announcement on March 3 that Russia would secure a third of the Italian navy. However, it must be recognized that American neutrality toward Finland may be a complicating factor in our participation in the ultimate Finnish settlement.

The Soviet Union's reference to reparations focuses attention on an important issue of the forthcoming peace that has thus far received little attention in this country. That the U.S.S.R. expects enemy nations to repair the damage and destruction wrought by their armies comes as no surprise, for last fall Professor Varga, a leading Russian economist, estimated that the Soviet Union would have a claim of \$150 billion against Germany alone. But it is in Moscow's proposed armistice terms for Finland that reparations are for the first time applied to a nation other than Germany. Remembering the difficulties that arose from efforts to collect \$32 billion from Germany after World War I, all the Allies will need to work out a united policy on reparations lest this question again lead to economic chaos.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

JAPAN TIGHTENS HOME FRONT AS OUTER DEFENSES CRUMBLE

Japan's rulers are leaving few stones unturned in their attempts to cope with present difficulties and to prepare for new war problems of still greater seriousness. Under measures announced in Tokyo on March 4, total mobilization of all high school and college students will take place; school and college buildings will be made available as military storehouses, hospitals or air raid shelters; women will be subject to labor mobilization; and important new air raid precautions will be initiated. Food consumption and luxury activities are to be curtailed, and all afternoon and evening papers discontinued.

ADDED POWER FOR TOJO. These moves are designed to help tighten up the war apparatus. They are part of a series of significant internal developments during the past month, including the replacement of three Cabinet Ministers (Agriculture and Commerce, Finance, and Transportation and Communications), the removal of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, and the announcement of the largest budget in Japanese history, requiring sharp increases in taxes and war savings. The main objectives of current policy would seem to be to further centralize Japanese economic and political life; to prepare for

mass air raids on Japanese cities; to secure maximum labor power for essential production, especially of ships and planes; to eliminate all unnecessary economic activity; and to impress on the general population the full gravity of Japan's military position. One of the important by-products of the process has been a further development of the power of Premier Tojo who so far appears to have successfully "passed the buck" for all difficulties to his political and military associates.

Especially significant is the change in propaganda inside Japan. As is well known, the Japanese authorities—although frequently speaking of a "crisis" in general terms—for a long time sought to hide from their people the blows that the United Nations were inflicting in the Pacific. Now this policy is being modified, and the people have been told a few of the details of military developments, notably in the communiqué of February 21, admitting the loss of cruisers, destroyers, transports and planes at Truk, and that of February 26, announcing the loss of 6,500 Japanese on Kwajalein and Roi in the Marshalls. Apparently the government has decided that the entire truth can no longer be kept from the country.

There is also some reason to suspect that growing popular concern over the military situation may have helped to bring about the change.

DISAGREEMENT IN TOKYO? However difficult it may be to judge the temper of the Japanese people, signs are certainly not lacking of differences within Japan's ruling circles. The Cabinet shake-up and the dismissal of the Chiefs of Staff are suggestive of deep disagreement over war policy. Japan's leaders are presumably doing some hard thinking about how to anticipate future attacks and how to prolong hostilities in the hope that the United States will become war-weary and accept a negotiated peace. This is clearly a fruitful field for official disagreement, especially since many Tokyo officials must be wondering whether their own country will not succumb to war-weariness first.

Although, in comparison with the European war, the Pacific conflict is still in an early stage, the ground is already being knocked from under some of the alarmist conceptions circulated about Japan not so many months ago. No one, for example, any longer suggests that it will be necessary to fight for every inch of ground on the road to Tokyo, since it is indisputably clear that, with the overwhelming air and sea power made possible by American production, important island areas can be passed by in our forward push through Pacific waters. The United States fleet, instead of being restricted to a rather small ocean radius by the necessity of returning frequently to rear bases, can now carry its bases with it for considerable periods of time. The development of the "fleet train," involving tankers, ammunition and supply ships, floating drydocks and other elements required for repairs and replenishment of fuel and materials, gives our fleet a phenomenal mobility.

RE-VIEWING THE JAPANESE SOLDIER. Our conception of the Japanese soldier is also being changed by the course of events. His bravery, de-

termination and formidable military qualities remain unquestioned, but he is very different from the superman who, we were told, would never crack or surrender. A London *Times* report of January 8 from the New Guinea front declares of the Japanese private: "He is extraordinarily dependent upon his officers and very much at a loss when, as has happened more than once in this theatre, all his officers are killed. On such occasions he huddles together with his fellows and seems to be deprived of all power of action and decision." And on Kwajalein veteran American infantrymen, with previous experience in the Aleutians, were said to have been convinced that most of the Japanese soldiers would have surrendered had it not been for the opposition of their officers and a few determined regulars.

This testimony that enemy troops do not possess an indestructible morale offers a basis for a realistic, although not a complacent, view of the Far Eastern war. We still have a long way to go in Asia, but we are clearly going there at a faster pace than anyone could have anticipated two years ago. The progress that is being made, however, places new responsibilities on United Nations policy-makers, for it is becoming increasingly necessary to pay attention to the political aspects of the war with Japan. As long as Japan seemed to many to be an unbreakable political unit, there was no strong compulsion to think of the Japanese people as an important element in future developments. Now a new phase of the war is approaching when, under the impact of mass bombings, Japan's common man may assume considerable political significance. Plainly, it is necessary for the United Nations to arrive, so far as events permit, at more concrete conclusions about future policy toward Japan.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

Pius XII on World Problems, by James W. Naughton, S.J. New York, America Press, 1943. \$2.00

Useful analysis of the Pope's pronouncements by subject with workable index.

A Professor at Large, by Stephen Duggan. New York, Macmillan, 1943. \$3.50

The long-time head of the Institute of International Education writes interestingly of efforts to create among people of different countries a better understanding of each other and each other's culture.

Peace and Reconstruction: A Catholic Layman's Approach, by Michael O'Shaughnessy. New York, Harper, 1943. \$2.00

Bases his hopes for social justice on the Papal Encyclicals and on many years of practical business experience in the United States and abroad.

What is the Allied stake in Yugoslavia? What are the roots of Yugoslavia's internal conflict? What has Axis occupation meant? What are the Partisans' goals? What is the position of the government-in-exile? What are the prospects for Balkan federation?

THE STRUGGLE FOR YUGOSLAVIA

by Winifred N. Hadsel

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
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Washington News Letter



MARCH 6.—On March 11, 1941 President Roosevelt signed "an Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"—the lend-lease law. On March 11, 1943, after affirmative votes of 407 to 6 in the House and 82 to 0 in the Senate, lend-lease was extended for one year, to June 30, 1944. Now Congress is considering a resolution authorizing the Act's extension for a second time, and hearings are being held before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Chairman Leo T. Crowley of the Foreign Economic Administration, the agency administering the Act, told the committee on March 1 that lend-lease aid up to December 31, 1943 totaled slightly less than \$20 billion, or about 14 per cent of our defense and war expenditures since the Act went into force.

WHAT LEND-LEASE SETTLEMENT? Congressional renewal of lend-lease is taken for granted. Chairman Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee expects the hearings to end this week or early next week, and the House will debate the bill soon afterwards. Some Republican members of the House have prepared amendments aimed at restricting the President's authority to determine the benefits which the United States shall receive in return for distributing goods under lend-lease. Section 3, paragraph (b), of the Act states: "The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized . . . shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory."

President Roosevelt in his Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the year ended March 11, 1942 listed these four benefits: 1. Direct military assistance to American security which results from the fight our Allies are waging against the common enemy; 2. Reciprocal aid we receive from our Allies (which, according to Chairman Crowley of FEA, totaled \$1,500,000,000 by September 30, 1943); 3. Possible return to us of goods sent out on lend-lease; 4. Realization of the objectives set forth in Article VII of the Master Agreement, which envisions "mutually advantageous" economic collaboration among nations after the war. The House and Senate Committee Reports on lend-lease extension, of February 26 and March 10, 1943, respectively, accepted the President's catalogue of benefits; and the catalogue is safe from enlargement this year unless Congress enacts restrictive amendments proposed by critics of

the Administration. Representative Vorys, Republican, of Ohio, is considering offering an amendment to change the law's title to "Mutual War Aid Act," which is innocuous in itself but dangerous for the Administration in that, if it were accepted, proponents of amendments modifying Section 3 (b) might find it easier to get consideration.

Even tentative contemplation by Congressmen of restrictive amendments shows a present concern for the nature of the governmental economic settlement that will follow the war. President Roosevelt announced on March 3 that Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., will take part in economic and political talks in London affecting the United States and Britain. Press reports said that discussion of agreements that might be reached under Article VII of the Master Agreement was on Mr. Stettinius' agenda. Congress will of course reserve the right to pass on proposals to implement Article VII. "The form chosen for any particular proposal in this field will follow normal constitutional practice," the House Foreign Affairs Committee declared in its 1943 lend-lease report. The Committee also said that "payment in gold or in goods has in the past proved self-defeating and destructive, and would after this war seriously interfere with the achievement of the conditions of world economic order on which the prosperity of this country largely depends."

AID TO BRITAIN AND RUSSIA. Britain and Russia have been the chief beneficiaries of lend-lease. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3: "The U.S.S.R. . . . is to a substantial degree dependent upon the United States in maintaining her lines of communication" by the transportation equipment provided under lend-lease. Administrator Crowley said that the lend-lease shipments to Russia up to December 31, 1943 included 170,000 trucks; 33,000 jeeps; 25,000 other military vehicles; 4,700 tanks and tank destroyers; 100,000 submachine guns; 1,350,000 tons of steel; 384,000 tons of aluminum, copper and other metals; \$400,000,000 worth of industrial equipment; 7,800 planes; 740,000 tons of aviation gasoline and other petroleum products; and 145,000 tons of petroleum refinery equipment. Shipments to Britain included 3,900 planes; \$460,000,000 worth of aircraft engines and parts; aviation gasoline; 4,800,000 tons of steel; 460,000 tons of non-ferrous metals and other essential raw and fabricated materials.

BLAIR BOLLES

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